Louisiana Law Review
Volume 80
Number 1 Fall 2019

Article 11

3-3-2020

From Deepsouth to WesternGeco: The Patent Provision
HeardAround the World
Sam H. Boyer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Sam H. Boyer, From Deepsouth to WesternGeco: The Patent Provision HeardAround the World, 80 La. L.
Rev. (2020)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol80/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

From Deepsouth to WesternGeco: The Patent
Provision Heard Around the World
Sam H. Boyer*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .................................................................................. 166
I.

United States Patent Law: From Deepsouth to
Section 271(f)............................................................................... 168
A. The Impact of Deepsouth: Section 271(f).............................. 169
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality.......................... 170
1. Policy Considerations...................................................... 171
2. The Inconsistent Application of the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality ............................................... 172

II.

Section 284: Damages in Patent Law Regarding
Extraterritoriality.......................................................................... 175
A. Damages in Patent Law ......................................................... 176
B. Extraterritorial Damages in Patent Law................................. 177
1. Extraterritorial Damages Jurisprudence .......................... 179
2. WesternGeco’s Over-Inclusive Majority ........................ 180

III. Right Result, Wrong Reason: Issues with WesternGeco.............. 183
A. Justice Gorsuch’s WesternGeco Dissent................................ 185
B. WesternGeco’s Impact........................................................... 188
IV. Proposed Conflict of Laws Approach and
Foreign Relations Law Factor Test .............................................. 191
A. Conflict of Laws Analysis ..................................................... 191
1. Louisiana’s Conflict of Laws Approach ......................... 193
2. Application of Article 3515 in WesternGeco .................. 194
B. Factor Test ............................................................................. 195
1. The Late Justice Scalia’s Take ........................................ 195
2. Reconciling Antitrust and Patent Law ............................ 198
Conclusion.................................................................................... 199

Copyright 2019, by SAM H. BOYER.
* J.D. candidate 2020, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. I would like to thank Professor Lee Ann Lockridge and the Louisiana
Law Review Volume 79 Board for helping me through this writing process.

337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd 171

11/27/19 9:28 AM

166

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

INTRODUCTION
High-tech, high-stakes, multinational patent disputes may be modern
and flashy, but one tool in the United States patent holder’s arsenal, 35
U.S.C. § 271(f), has beginnings as humble as the shrimp and its inelegant
vein. Anyone visiting southern Louisiana can attest that shrimp are a
dietary staple. Although shrimp certainly present a “gustatory delight,”
they “wear their skeletons outside of their bodies,” creating an issue for
those looking to indulge.1 Moreover, their gastrointestinal veins shallowly
traverse their backs.2 Accordingly, one must tediously peel and devein
each individual shrimp prior to consumption—that is, until commercial
equipment arrived on the scene.3
To industrialize the process of preparing shrimp, Laitram Corporation
(“Laitram”) meticulously developed a shrimp slitter and deveining device
that quickly and cheaply processed large quantities of shrimp.4 Seeking
exclusivity for its innovation, Laitram obtained a patent in 1958.5 Despite
the patent, Deepsouth Packing Company (“Deepsouth”) began
manufacturing and selling a similar shrimp deveining device.6 Laitram
subsequently sued Deepsouth to halt its operation.7 The trial court issued
an injunction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 Determined to keep its
business alive, however, Deepsouth requested the United States Supreme
Court’s approval to continue selling its machine abroad.9
Section 271(a) of the Patent Act provides that anyone who makes or
sells an infringing device within the United States is liable for patent
infringement.10 Deepsouth successfully argued that by ceasing the
manufacturing process on each machine just shy of completion, it was
neither “making” nor “selling” the patented invention within the United
States in violation of U.S. patent law.11 Instead, Deepsouth shipped the
1. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (1969).
2. Id.
3. See generally id. (discussing the economic desirability and introduction
of these devices).
4. Id.
5. U.S. Patent No. 2,825,927 (filed Mar. 11, 1958).
6. Deepsouth, 301 F. Supp. at 1043.
7. Id.
8. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928 (1971).
9. Deepsouth requested a modification to the injunction that would allow it
to continue manufacturing the deveiner in certain situations. Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
10. “[W]hoever . . . makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States . . . infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
11. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523.
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deveiner in three separate and individual components to purchasers in
Brazil, accompanied with a letter explaining Deepsouth’s legal woes and
assuring the customers that the last step in the assembly process did not
require technical expertise and could be completed in less than an hour.12
The Supreme Court allowed Deepsouth to continue selling its nearly
completed deveiners to its Brazilian consumers using this method.13
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, expressed his concerns regarding the
majority opinion: “[Permitting Deepsouth’s activity] would allow an
infringer to set up shop next door to a patent-protected inventor whose
product enjoys a substantial foreign market and deprive him of this
valuable business.”14 Thereafter, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f),
closing the loophole exposed by Deepsouth.15 Since Deepsouth, however,
courts have inconsistently applied § 271(f), posing a threat to the strongly
domestic nature of patent systems—both the United States’ system and
those of other nations.16 The Supreme Court most recently reviewed
§ 271(f) in WesternGeco v. Ion Geophysical Corporation, which similarly
involved an infringer shipping a patented device abroad.17 Against an
extraterritorial backdrop, the Court ultimately held the infringer liable to
the U.S. patent holder, elucidating § 271(f)’s applicability and how
§ 271(f) relates to patent law damages.18
Although WesternGeco first seems to pertain only to a niche carve-out
of a specialized area of U.S. law, the wider implications become apparent
in reading the Court’s opinion.19 Specifically, the Court not only addressed
extraterritoriality and the current status of the Deepsouth loophole, but the
Court also espoused a broad view on the nature of compensatory damages
and the role of proximate cause in the extraterritoriality context.20 These
issues, although far from settled, present the possibility of systematic
retaliation from offended countries because the United States’ current
12. Deepsouth, 443 F.2d at 938.
13. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532.
14. Id. at 534. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (creating a cause of action for patent holders against
alleged infringers who supply components of an invention abroad for incorporation
into an infringing device).
16. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent
Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2017).
17. See generally WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129
(2018).
18. Id.
19. Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality and Proximate Cause after
WesternGeco, YALE J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2019).
20. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2130.
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position potentially violates the general rule that patent law reaches to a
country’s borders and no further.21 If the United States begins to blur this
distinction by reaching beyond its borders, offended countries could begin
to do the same, upsetting a powerful international understanding built on
years of cooperation.22 To mitigate this problem, courts should adopt the
suggested conflict of laws analysis or factor test.23 These frameworks
afford courts flexibility in awarding foreign damages in § 271(f) cases to
militate against an offensive result.
This Comment will address the current state of extraterritoriality in
patent law in light of the Supreme Court’s recent WesternGeco holding.
Part I will broadly explain patent law, the reasons for curtailing the reach of
U.S. law, and how courts have awkwardly married these two constructs. Part
II will discuss damages in patent law before expounding on damages related
to § 271(f), specifically focusing on the 2018 Supreme Court case
WesternGeco. Part II also explains WesternGeco in full, including the
majority’s analysis of the availability of lost foreign profits and the
extraterritorial implications. Part III will discuss how current U.S. patent law
overreach may affect the United States’ international standing and the
deficiencies in the courts’ analyses when it comes to assessing possible
international consequences, heavily referencing the dissent in WesternGeco.
Part IV will propose a conflict of laws analysis borrowed from the Louisiana
Civil Code and, additionally, an alternative analytical framework adapted
from antitrust law.
I. UNITED STATES PATENT LAW: FROM DEEPSOUTH TO SECTION 271(F)
The U.S. Constitution confers on Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”24 Wholly a matter of federal law, patent law grants
enterprising inventors temporary monopolies on patentable subject matter.25
21. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Intellectual Property in Outer Space:
International Law, National Jurisdiction and Exclusive Rights in Geospatial Data
and Data Bases, 32 J. SPACE L. 319, 339–346 (2006).
22. Id.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. “Patentable subject matter” refers to inventions that are useful, novel, and
non-obvious. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (specifying a 20-year term from
date of issuance); id. § 101 (requiring the “process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or . . . improvement thereof” to be “new and useful” to
obtain a patent); id. §§ 102, 103.
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Providing these temporary monopolies incentivizes inventors to experiment
and develop novel and non-obvious inventions that aid in the progress “of
science and useful arts” as well as spur beneficial economic activity.26
Stemming from English law, U.S. patent law developed through
several iterations of patent acts promulgated since this country’s genesis.27
Most recently, Congress enacted the America Invents Act in 2011, which
overhauled the previous 1952 patent system, although § 271(f) remained
untouched.28 Despite reworking the system and attempting to harmonize
the U.S. patent system with those of other nations, Congress did not solve
all of the difficult substantive problems associated with patent law—
especially in the extraterritorial context.29 Extraterritoriality stands in
direct contrast to the strongly domestic nature of patent law, creating
internal friction that courts continue to grapple with today.30
A. The Impact of Deepsouth: Section 271(f)
Directly after Deepsouth,31 U.S. patents faced grave vulnerabilities.32
Allowing a would-be infringing company to avoid patent infringement
liability by finishing the manufacturing process abroad undermines the
purpose of patents.33 This type of infringement severs the patent holder’s
foreign market, significantly devaluing the patent holder’s intellectual
property by inflicting financial harm in the form of opportunity loss.34 In
Deepsouth, the Court found this type of behavior permissible under
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. See Craig Allan Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents,
90:51 B. U. L. REV 51, 53–55 (2010). See generally Graham v. John Deere, 383
U.S. 1 (1966).
28. MARY LAFRANCE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 396–97 (5th ed. 2018).
29. Id. (The America Invents Act brought “the U.S. into greater harmony with
the patent systems of other nations.”).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (grounding patent law domestically by providing that
anyone who “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the
United States . . . infringes the patent”) (emphasis added); WesternGeco v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
31. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
32. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)
(referring to the loophole that Deepsouth exposed).
33. See id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. “Opportunity loss” refers to the fact that patent holders would essentially
forego business that would have otherwise been available. See 35 U.S.C. § 284
(giving patent holders “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement”);
see also Holbrook, supra note 16.
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then-existing law.35 In response to Deepsouth’s controversial holding,
Congress enacted § 271(f), closing this loophole.36 In § 271(f), Congress
expanded patent infringement to include supplying components
originating in the United States to be combined abroad when the complete
action would have constituted infringement if it had solely occurred within
the United States.37
As patent holders salvaged the ability to litigate against overseas activity,
extraterritorial and comity concerns arose.38 Grounded domestically,
intellectual property remains a strongly territorial body of law.39 Accordingly,
the enactment of § 271(f), specifically its extraterritorial language, exhumes
curious policy considerations.40 Patent law aims to remain strongly
territorial.41 By applying § 271(f), courts reach beyond our borders and give
some effect to U.S. patents abroad.42
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The extraterritorial hook in § 271(f) implicates comity, which refers
to the respect one country gives to another country’s legal system as a
matter of courtesy with the expectation of some degree of reciprocity.43
35. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. 523 (1972); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970 ed.).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2018).
37. Id.
38. Section 271(f) closes the loophole from Deepsouth but is arguably U.S.
patent law overreach. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). Any time our laws purport to extend
beyond territorial boundaries, comity and territoriality are invoked to ensure
courts permissibly resolve these matters.
39. Under the intellectual property umbrella, patent law distinguishes itself
from other areas of intellectual property by remaining significantly more
territorial. See WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018);
see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (grounding patent law domestically by providing that anyone who
“makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United
States . . . infringes the patent”) (emphasis added).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (prohibiting patent holders from “actively induc[ing]
the combination of such components outside of the United States . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749; Brief of Intellectual Property
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, WesternGeco v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 [hereinafter Brief of IP Law Scholars].
41. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007).
42. See id.
43. The doctrine of comity, mirroring the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s
mutuality but on an international scale, acts as a safeguard against U.S. law
overreach by urging the courts to afford deference to other countries’ legal systems
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Courts and commentators, however, struggle to fully understand what
exactly international comity requires.44 Because comity has “no clear
analytical framework, . . . courts have been left to cobble together their
own approach.”45 In the § 271(f) context, comity evaluation generally
takes the form of the “presumption against extraterritoriality,” if an
evaluation occurs at all.46 The presumption against extraterritoriality
suggests that U.S. law only applies domestically, absent contrary
instructions from Congress.47 In that capacity, the presumption serves to
safeguard against holdings that may offend other countries’ bodies of
law.48 In theory, the presumption against extraterritoriality reduces the
probability that a holding will elicit adverse extraterritorial implications
by avoiding foreign applications of U.S. law.49 The presumption advocates
that a court may only consider extraterritorial presentations in exceptional
scenarios within the scope of congressional language.50 Consequently,
§ 271(f) and extraterritoriality in patent law invoke two prevailing
antithetical policy considerations.51
1. Policy Considerations
Patent holders’ interest in full economic protection and the public
interest in avoiding condemnation of the international community, which
stand diametrically opposed, constitute the backdrop from which courts’
analyses must develop. First, patent holders should be able to fully protect
their inventions from infringers looking to capitalize on their devices by

as a matter of courtesy. William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2073–74, 2094 (2015) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993)); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (“actively induce the
combination of such components outside of the United States . . .”) (emphasis
added).
44. Dodge, supra note 43, at 2073–74.
45. Id. (describing three different types of comity). This Comment focuses
on what Dodge refers to as “prescriptive comity.” See id.
46. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
47. Id.
48. Dodge, supra note 43, at 2080 (“[The presumption] serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord.”).
49. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
50. See generally Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007).
51. See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
(1972); Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 444–45; Life Tech. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137
S. Ct. 734 (2017).
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exploiting the Deepsouth loophole.52 Permitting would-be infringers,
including foreign and domestic companies, to escape liability by setting
up a finishing plant abroad would run afoul of a fundamental concept in
patent law: protecting proprietary information.53
Second, the doctrine of comity steers courts away from interpreting
§ 271(f) in ways that disrespect laws of other nations.54 U.S. patent law,
although a powerful tool for inventors, cannot govern foreign conduct
without risking impermissible overreach.55 In other words, international
patent law is perhaps a matter best approached by using coordinated efforts
with cooperating countries such that the interests of all countries are
appropriately represented.56 Laws that undermine this concept fall out of
comportment with the international understanding that patent laws extend
only to each nation’s borders.57
2. The Inconsistent Application of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
For the presumption against extraterritoriality to have the intended
effect in the § 271(f) context, courts must apply the presumption
consistently.58 Over time, with steady application, courts could begin to
realize the presumption’s applicable limits and define its scope.59 In short,
consistency breeds consistency. Courts, however, remain inconsistent in
their application of the presumption in the § 271(f) context,60 which
weakens the presumption by leaving future courts to decide when and how
to utilize it.61
Professor Timothy Holbrook, who has written extensively on the
presumption against extraterritoriality, has cataloged courts’ continued
inconsistencies in applying § 271(f). Professor Holbrook highlighted three
frequently used approaches: (1) a forceful application of the presumption
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
53. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 455.
55. RJR Nabisco, Inc v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct 2090, 2100 (2016)
(“United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”) (quoting
Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454).
56. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights arts. 27–34, 44–46, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
57. Id.
58. See Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
59. See id.
60. See discussion supra Section I.B.
61. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
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against extraterritoriality; (2) simply mentioning but dismissing the
presumption; and (3) refraining from mentioning the presumption
altogether.62
Forceful application of the presumption against extraterritoriality
avoids effectuating a needlessly offensive outcome by safeguarding
against U.S. law overreach. Endeavoring to comport with a forceful
comity analysis, the Supreme Court in WesternGeco most recently
employed the RJR Nabisco63 two-part test.64 The RJR Nabisco test
instructs courts to determine: (1) whether the conduct at bar rebuts the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and, if the presumption is rebutted,
(2) whether the conduct involved in the case is primarily domestic.65
Before WesternGeco, however, the Supreme Court employed alternate
means of addressing comity. For example, in Microsoft v. AT&T, a 2007
case, the Court addressed whether software constitutes a component within
the meaning of § 271(f)(1).66 In its reasoning, the Court acknowledged the
exceptional nature of § 271(f).67 Moreover, the Court, relying heavily on the
presumption, resolved any doubt as to statutory interpretation by favoring
the territorial application of the statute, that is, in favor of leaving
Microsoft’s foreign software use outside the reach of U.S. patent law.68 This
holding illustrates the result of the presumption’s forceful effect.69 A
forceful application of the presumption complies with the legal theory
suggesting courts should interpret statutory exceptions narrowly.70
62. Id. (“At times, the court expressly has applied the presumption, giving it
forceful effect. Other times, the court mentions the presumption yet dismisses its
application. And yet at other times, the court fails to mention the presumption
explicitly, ignoring the significant body of law that underlies it. The court has at
times afforded extraterritorial reach in the face of seemingly clear language, while
other times rejecting such scope.”).
63. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093–2094
(2016) (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255; Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659). RJR Nabisco articulated the twostep approach to extraterritoriality developed in Morrison and Kiobel in a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against cigarette
manufacturers alleging a global money-laundering scheme in connection with
organized crime.
64. WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2133 (2018).
65. See generally id.
66. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
67. Id. at 441.
68. Id. at 437.
69. See generally id.
70. See id. at 442 (“§ 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that our patent
law does not apply extraterritorially, we resist giving the language in which

337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd 179

11/27/19 9:28 AM

174

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Likewise, by rejecting the extraterritorial application,71 the Court
recognized that “patent laws, like other laws, are to be understood against
a background presumption against extraterritorial reach.”72 By employing
a forceful application of the presumption, the Court ensured that its
holding would not upset international patent law understandings, which
seek to keep countries’ patent laws within their own borders.
When a court merely mentions the presumption without applying it
forcefully, the presumption fails to carry its intended weight. Courts,
however, occasionally mention the presumption, but abandon its function
when the presumption militates against their desired holding.73
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors
USA, Inc., a 2010 Federal Circuit case, involved a patent holder who
brought an infringement suit related to a foreign offshore drilling
apparatus.74 The court directly acknowledged the applicability of the
presumption against extraterritoriality but failed to further explain how
and if the presumption shaped the holding.75 The opinion in Transocean
illustrates the presumption’s perceived importance but haphazard
application—courts recognize the presumption’s merit, but they
frequently gloss over its application, perhaps in an effort to avoid
arguments that weigh against the holdings they see fit.76
Lastly, courts occasionally avoid the presumption altogether, ignoring
an admired doctrine that provides useful direction for analysis. In 2017, the
Supreme Court reviewed Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., which
involved a DNA testing kit manufactured abroad, to determine the precise
meaning of § 271(f).77 The Court mentioned the strong domestic nature of
patent law but failed to discuss the presumption, ultimately holding that the
alleged infringer’s conduct did not violate § 271(f).78 In effectuating this
Congress cast § 271(f) an expansive interpretation”); WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at
2136 (“This principle, commonly called the presumption against
extraterritoriality, has deep roots.”).
71. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441.
72. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
73. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
74. Id.
75. Although the Federal Circuit held that there was no liability on the facts,
the Federal Circuit further stated that, as a matter of law, an offer for sale in a
foreign country would infringe on the U.S. patent if the eventual sale would be in
the United States, even if the sale of the device never occurs. Id. at 1309.
76. See generally id.
77. Life Tech. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017).
78. See id.
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territorial holding, the Court’s concerning lack of a formal comity analysis
upset any foothold the presumption otherwise had.79
These cases collectively demonstrate courts’ discomfort with
extraterritoriality in patent law, specifically when applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality.80 Rather than building on the presumption, courts
issue opinions that continually evade the heart of the question.81 The
presumption, although not wholly sufficient in and of itself, provides some
safeguard against an improper extraterritorial holding. The courts’ failure to
regularly apply it, however, effectively defangs what the presumption may
have otherwise provided.82
Although the presumption provides a useful precaution, courts
occasionally rely on the mere fact that § 271(f) refers to conduct “outside
of the United States” to rebut the presumption.83 The already-defanged
presumption, in those cases, “would be a craven watchdog indeed if it
retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the
case.”84 Not only is the presumption insufficient in this context—courts
inconsistently apply the insufficient presumption.85
II. SECTION 284: DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW REGARDING
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The inconsistent application of the insufficient presumption would be
rather inconsequential if courts were not additionally lumping it together
with damages provisions, thereby creating or increasing disconcerting
retaliatory possibilities. Nevertheless, parties primarily litigate patent
claims in the hope of recovering damages, making it all the more important
for courts to fully consider the implications of awarding sizable recoveries.
79. See id.
80. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
81. Id.
82. See generally id. at 1749.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f); see also WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138
S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
84. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010):
That presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive,
but its application requires further analysis. For it is a rare case of
prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with
the territory of the United States. But the presumption against
extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if
it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is
involved in the case.
85. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
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A. Damages in Patent Law
Generally true in any civil case, a court must determine liability before
addressing damages. Accordingly, when alleged extraterritorial patent
infringement occurs, the court must first decide whether the conduct
constitutes infringement under § 271.86 Second, if the court finds the
activity to be infringing, it must then address remedies under § 284—the
patent damages statute.87 Generally, courts issue injunctive relief to ensure
infringement cessation.88 Additionally, § 284 provides a damages floor—
reasonable royalties89—for the patent holder.90 Section 284 also allows a
court to award damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement”
and even to award a three-fold increase to a jury’s damages finding.91
Typically, a patent holder establishes losses sustained from the alleged
infringer’s proscribed use by showing a reasonable probability that, but
for the infringement, the patent holder would have been better financially
situated.92 When a patent holder’s product encompasses all or most of a
market share, and an infringer enters the same market, the patent holder
generally establishes damages by showing the profits lost due to the
infringer’s entrance to the market.93 Issues arise, however, when a patent
holder attempts to recover for losses suffered in a foreign country.

86. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
88. Injunctive relief precludes the further production of the infringing device to
mitigate damage to the patent holder. But injunctive relief is not automatic. See
Ebay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (departing from the
“general rule” of issuing an injunction in patent infringement cases, the Court denied
the injunction based on a four-factor test); Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman,
Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s
Application of Ebay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145 (2017) (“District courts that grant an
injunction after a finding of liability are highly likely to be affirmed on appeal,
whereas district courts that deny an injunction have a statistically significant lower
affirmance rate.”).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 284. “Reasonable royalties” refers to a reasonable amount of
money that the patent holder could have charged for licensing the patent to the
infringing party.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
91. Id.
92. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.05 (2018).
93. Id.
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B. Extraterritorial Damages in Patent Law
Awarding lost foreign profits generally aids in equitably remedying
infringement and comports with § 271(f)’s closing of the Deepsouth
loophole, but this approach also implicates comity in an area where courts
severely lack consistency and care.94 In particular, § 284’s repercussive
nature amplifies extraterritorial concerns.95 Forcing an injunction and
reasonable royalties abroad raises ostensible extraterritorial concerns.
Frequently awarding additional damages increases the likelihood of
systematic retaliation by offended foreign sovereigns.96 Courts compound
this likelihood of retaliation in cases where they award the patent holder
lost foreign profits without a proper explanation.97 Patent infringement
remedies, therefore, best illustrate the need for cohesion and consistency
in the patent system.98 If U.S. courts continue to award these damages,
they risk unsettling the status quo, which could lead to systemic changes
in other countries’ patent law frameworks as they try to match our
extraterritorial stance.99 Therefore, the damages judgment provides the
most illuminating justification for a foreign sovereign to expand its patent
law reach as a response to U.S. courts’ infringement findings under
§ 271(f).100
Furthermore, erratic and uncertain awarding of lost foreign profits leads
to difficult business planning for a company.101 Patent law damages yield

94. See WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
95. See generally Bernard Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap, 93
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 87 (2016).
96. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Worse yet,
the tables easily could be turned. If our courts award compensation to U.S. patent
owners for foreign uses where our patents don’t run, what happens when foreign
courts return the favor?”).
97. Courts not only fail to give a proper explanation, but they also tend to
elide the issue altogether. Section 271(f) has both a territorial prong (“supply from
the U.S.”) and a foreign prong (“outside the U.S.”). Courts tend to fall back on
the domestic prong and say that because the conduct contemplates domestic
activity, it can be applied like a domestic statute and, therefore, needs no
framework for analyzing extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007); WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); see also § 271(f) (2018).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
99. See Chao, supra note 95.
100. See id.
101. See id.
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notoriously large sums,102 and businesses must pay high rates to litigate
these matters.103 Accordingly, when making executive decisions, such as
choosing manufacturing locations and assessing legal vulnerability, the
ideal application of the presumption and § 271(f) properly situates counsel
to advise their companies on possible repercussions.104 Given the unclear
analyses by courts, however, effective advising becomes tricky because
business executives must essentially gamble on whether the potential
recovery justifies hefty litigation costs.105
On the other hand, failure to allow § 284 to apply to its fullest extent
neuters the purpose of § 271(f).106 By foregoing foreign damages due to
these extraterritorial concerns, courts risk inadequately compensating the
injured patent holder, which would weaken the U.S. patent system as a
whole, as patent law fails to fully protect inventors.107
In assessing the countervailing principles regarding § 284’s
applicability in instances involving foreign conduct, courts have three
different options in applying the presumption: (1) apply it only to § 271(f)
in assessing whether the alleged infringer did, in fact, infringe; (2) apply
it only to § 284 in assessing whether the misconduct entitles the patent
holder to foreign damages; or (3) apply it to both §§ 271(f) and 284 such
that the court addresses the presumption twice—once in determining
existence of infringement and again in determining the appropriate remedy
therefor.108
102. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (awarding approximately $93 million in
foreign lost profits).
103. Hourly Rates Hit $1750 in IP Litigation, NAT’L ASS’N LEGAL FEE
ANALYSIS (July 16, 2018), http://www.thenalfa.org/blog/hourly-rates-hit-1750in-ip-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/A3FK-NFTB].
104. See Chao, supra note 95, at 90 (explaining that lack of clarity in courts
analyses “makes it extremely difficult to give good legal advice.”).
105. See, e.g., WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (2018).
106. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(f), 284. Section 271(f)’s purpose was to close the
Deepsouth loophole. See Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Diverted Sales From Patentee
to Infringer—Diverted Foreign Sales, 4 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 30:44
(2018).
107. 260 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELOR NL 2, Westlaw (Aug. 2018
Update). Barring “recovery of such damages was at odds with the statute on patent
damages and risked systematically undercompensating patent owners for
damages resulting from U.S. infringement.” Id.
108. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The presumption against extraterritorial reach of patent law
applies not just to identifying the conduct that will be deemed infringing but also
to assessing the damages that are to be imposed for domestic liability-creating
conduct.”). But see WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129. In the conflict of laws context,
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1. Extraterritorial Damages Jurisprudence
When courts approach extraterritorial damages in patent law, the main
inquiry becomes whether the presumption applies to liability, damages, or
both. The Federal Circuit in Power Integrations v. Fairchild originally
concluded that a patent holder may not recover extraterritorial damages in
a § 271(a) infringement case.109 Likewise, in Carnegie Mellon v. Marvell
Technology, a 2015 Federal Circuit case, Carnegie Mellon sued Marvell
Tech for infringing Carnegie Mellon’s data recording patent.110 Finding
infringement under § 271(a), the traditional infringement statute,111 the
Federal Circuit highlighted the district court’s error in failing to give the
jury instruction on the presumption against extraterritoriality.112
Moreover, the court noted the presumption applies not only to the
infringement inquiry but also to the remedies inquiry.113 Relying on the
presumption, the court decided that, despite the proximity between
Marvell’s infringement and its domestic activity,114 the conduct’s
extraterritoriality precluded an award of damages.115 Thus, despite the
clear causal link between foreign sales and the deleterious impact felt by
Carnegie Mellon, the court rejected this causation-based approach and
reversed Carnegie Mellon’s award of foreign damages.116

dépeçage provides for the possibility that one jurisdiction’s laws could control the
issue of liability, and another jurisdiction’s laws control the issue of damages. See
Dépeçage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
109. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l., Inc., 711 F.3d
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
110. Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1306.
111. Section 271 provides for different types of patent infringement. Section
271(a) proscribes patent infringement when somebody makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells the patented invention within the United States. Section 271(f) provides
that patent infringement occurs when someone ships components outside the
United States for combination and use or sale abroad.
112. Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1284.
113. Id. at 1287.
114. Marvell’s domestic activities include the design and selling of these
microchips. Id. at 1291.
115. Importantly, the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s patent under § 271(a),
not § 271(f), which justified the strength the court gave the presumption,
considering that § 271(a) does not contemplate any foreign activity whatsoever.
Id. at 1308.
116. Notably, however, the court relied on the appellate court’s holding in
WesternGeco which the Supreme Court overturned. Id.
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Carnegie Mellon set the stage for extraterritorial damages in patent
law.117 The court essentially held that absolutely no extraterritorial
damages were permissible under § 284 when the underlying infringement
resulted from traditional infringement under § 271(a).118 Under the logic
of Carnegie Mellon, any allowance of extraterritorial damages must
exclusively arise from the language of § 271(f) and therefore
independently rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.119
Contrary to Carnegie Mellon, some scholars have concluded that “a
liability versus remedies line is a distinction without a difference.”120 In
other words, some scholars posit that the infringement analysis and the
damages analysis are seemingly similar—after exhaustively determining
a company has infringed, damages automatically follow to the extent
allowed by § 284.121 In that sense, however, courts conflate the main filter
for liability and the main filter for recovery such that full recovery is binary
and flows any time the court determines liability.122
2. WesternGeco’s Over-Inclusive Majority
In 2018, the Supreme Court reviewed WesternGeco v. Ion Geophysical
Corp. to determine the relationship between §§ 271(f) and 284.123 Falling
squarely under § 271(f), Ion domestically manufactured components of
WesternGeco’s seismic technology and shipped the components abroad for
incorporation in the completed system—large surveying ships on the high
seas.124 After finding infringement, the jury awarded WesternGeco $93.4
million in lost profits and $12.5 million in reasonable royalties.125 In
addressing §§ 271(f) and 284, the Court concentrated on whether
WesternGeco could recover lost foreign profits in light of the fact that
117. See generally id. at 1306.
118. Id.
119. If no foreign damages in § 271(a) exist, then all foreign damages must
come from the invocation of § 271(f). Id. at 1287, 1306.
120. Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40, at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See generally WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129
(2018).
124. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
125. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 953 F. Supp. 2d 731, 755
(S.D. Tex. 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This
award represented 100% of the lost profits sought by WesternGeco and 84% of
the reasonable royalties sought. Id.
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§ 284 does not specifically have any territorial language.126 Recognizing
the extraterritoriality implications of forcing a company to surrender
foreign profits on the basis of U.S. patent rights, the Court utilized the RJR
Nabisco two-part test that, to reiterate, rests on: (1) whether the conduct
rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality and, if not, (2) whether
the case involves a domestic application of the statute.127 The Court,
however, elected to skip step one of the RJR Nabisco test because step one
could have “far-reaching effects in future cases.”128 Advancing to step two,
the Court determined that the conduct relevant to the inquiry occurred in
the United States because § 271(f)(2) contemplates the exporting of
components from within the United States.129 Accordingly, the Court
decided that the RJR Nabisco test permitted the recovery of foreign
damages.130
After analyzing the RJR Nabisco test, the Court focused on the
location of the infringement because the RJR Nabisco analysis alone did
not satisfy the underlying inquiry.131 The Court held that Ion’s activity
entitled WesternGeco to all damages under § 284, including lost foreign
profits, because § 271(f)(2) focuses on supplying components from the
United States—a domestic activity—rather than on inducing the
components’ combination outside of the United States. 132 The Court
determined that the statutory focus is domestic as opposed to
extraterritorial, ultimately finding that WesternGeco was entitled to the
excess damages.133 Although this outcome is not necessarily flawed, the
opinion lacks analytic rigor because the Court avoided grounding the
holding in the specific facts of the case. Opening the door to foreign lost
damages without a rigorous analysis of the facts could lead to a floodgates
126. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2132.
127. Id. (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)).
The RJR Nabisco test came as a recommendation from the Brief of IP Law
Scholars. See Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40.
128. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2136.
129. Id. at 2133 (“In sum, the focus of § 274 in a case involving infringement
under § 271(f)(2) is on the act of exporting components from the United States.
So, the conduct in this case that is relevant to the statutory focus clearly occurred
in the United States.”).
130. Id. at 2139.
131. Id. at 2137 (noting that the RJR Nabisco analysis alone “does not resolve
the case”).
132. Id. at 2138.
133. Id. Section 271(f) can be viewed as either a domestic statute with an
extraterritorial hook or an extraterritorial statute with a domestic hook. Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, ignores the possibility that the statute could be
construed as an extraterritorial statute with a domestic hook. Id.
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effect by which other courts automatically award foreign lost damages
without a proper analysis in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
precedent.134
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of U.S. laws; still, this analysis
does not comport with the district court and appellate court’s reasoning, as
well as scholar recommendations submitted in anticipation of
WesternGeco.135 In awarding lost foreign profits, the district court
considered § 271(f)’s origin and acknowledged that foregoing lost foreign
profits cuts against the purpose of § 271(f).136 The appellate court,
however, forcefully applied the presumption against extraterritoriality,
ultimately reversing the award of lost foreign profits.137 In reversing, the
court stated that the extraterritorial use “is an independent, intervening act
that, under almost all circumstances, cuts off the chain of causation.”138
Notably, the Supreme Court did not address this chain of causation
argument.139 Although the Supreme Court’s analysis initially seems
sufficient, it largely revolved around the domestic language of § 271(f).
According to the Court, because § 271(f) contains domestic language,
extraterritorial concerns are inherently rebutted, even insofar as the
damage award is concerned.140 This approach renders the presumption a
“craven watchdog,” as feared by the Morrison court.141
In their amicus briefs for WesternGeco, several renowned patent law
scholars wrote to the Court to express their extraterritoriality concerns.142
First, they urged the Court to exhaustively consider the issue’s

134. Id. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing scenarios not
contemplated by the majority that could stem from the holding).
135. Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40; Brief of Amicus Curiae Houston
Intellectual Property Law Association In Support of Neither Party, WesternGeco
v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) [hereinafter Brief of Houston
IP Law Assoc.].
136. The purpose for enacting § 271(f) was to close the loophole exploited in
Deepsouth. WesternGeco, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 749; see also Patent Law
Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 98–622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984).
137. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l., Inc.,
711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
138. Id.
139. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2144 n.3.
140. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2018); WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
141. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
142. Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40, at 10; Brief of Houston IP Law
Assoc., supra note 135.
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extraterritorial nature as to not offend notions of comity.143 Moreover, these
scholars rejected the idea that the § 271(f) analysis should serve as the sole
filter, instead advising the Court to consider the comity concerns in both the
§ 271(f) and the § 284 context through two separate analyses.144 Lastly, they
advocated for the RJR Nabisco two-part test but anticipated that the Court
would go beyond the test in its rigor.145 The consensus envisioned a need
for an analytically rigorous opinion that dissected the case’s
extraterritoriality.146 Additionally, the scholars warned against applying the
RJR Nabisco test “in a manner that is too capacious” and highlighted the
risk of clashing with foreign jurisdictions’ laws.147 Appearing only
marginally affected by these concerns, the Court placated some scholars’
recommendations in part and ignored other recommendations altogether.148
Despite landing on the correct conclusion, the Court’s aversion to these
ideas risks a holding that binds future courts to an improper analysis.
III. RIGHT RESULT, WRONG REASON: ISSUES WITH WESTERNGECO
WesternGeco offered sympathetic facts that made a finding for foreign
damages seem equitable.149 Ultimately, the Supreme Court in
WesternGeco faced a series of facts that easily justified the allowance of
foreign lost profits.150 First, the foreign conduct in WesternGeco occurred
on the high seas.151 This location made conflict of laws issues less salient
because foreign sovereigns have a reduced interest in U.S. laws reaching

143. Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40, at 14–15. (“The Court should
use [WesternGeco] as a vehicle to further elaborate on whether the presumption
still has teeth even after the application of the RJR Nabisco framework.”).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 15. (“Merely satisfying either step could still result in considerable
extraterritorial reach . . . .”). Some scholars suggested a proximate cause limitation
to remedies, while others insisted that conflict of laws concepts should play a role.
See Brief of Houston IP Law Assoc., supra note 135.
146. See Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40; Brief of Houston IP Law
Assoc., supra note 135.
147. Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40.
148. This sentence refers to the Court’s use of the RJR Nabisco test, although
not fully, and the Court’s failure to use causation as a damages limitation. See
WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2144 n.3 (2018); Brief
of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40.
149. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
150. Id.
151. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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to the high seas as opposed to their own territory.152 Second, although
WesternGeco held the patent for the seismic technology, it only utilized
the patent by offering its own surveying services.153 Thus, when Ion’s
customers assembled the system abroad, they directly competed with
WesternGeco’s own surveying business.154 This direct interference easily
satisfied causation considerations that courts could otherwise use to limit
foreign damages.155 In other words, WesternGeco’s damages did not result
from some speculative, attenuated argument but arose from direct
competition with the U.S. patent holder in a niche market.156 The Court
further justified its outcome by ignoring part one of the RJR Nabisco test,
which addresses whether the conduct rebuts the presumption against
extraterritoriality because of the potential far-reaching consequences of
the damages provision.157
This fact pattern, therefore, furthers Judge Corcoran’s twist on an old
adage: “good facts make bad law.”158 The majority likely felt “that the
extraterritoriality arguments militated against the relief it thought was
adequate” under § 271(f)(2).159 For this reason, the United States Supreme
Court guaranteed the equitable outcome rather than initiating an in-depth
extraterritoriality inquiry, which may have led to a countervailing result.160
The Court missed an opportunity to transparently analyze the facts in a

152. Although countries are highly interested in acts occurring within their
territories, the high seas—an area not directly controlled by one country—does
not logically pose the same territorial threat.
153. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
154. Id. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-CV05501-SI, 2018 WL 3472168 at *24 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2018) (“WesternGeco
proved that it had lost 10 specific survey contracts due to ION's infringement.”).
155. See Brief of Houston IP Law Assoc., supra note 135.
156. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1340. The Court in WesternGeco did not
attempt to delineate causation, and in fact omitted any notions of causation
altogether. See generally id. This argument relies on equity and the fact that these
facts really make it seem like WesternGeco deserved foreign damages. Id.
157. Under this logic, U.S. law could be applied in any given case with no
reference to the presumption against extraterritoriality, thereby abrogating the
presumption altogether. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2136 (“addressing step one
would require resolving difficult questions that do not change the outcome of the
case, but could have far-reaching effects in future cases”).
158. State v. Huerta, 855 P.2d 776, 781 (Ariz. 1993) (Corcoran, J., dissenting).
159. 260 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELOR NL 2, Westlaw (Aug. 2018
Update).
160. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2129.
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manner that supported the award in the instant case while simultaneously
satisfying an in-depth comity and conflicts analysis.161
Several shortcomings plagued the majority opinion.162 Although
WesternGeco utilized the RJR Nabisco two-part test, the majority refused
to embrace the more intensive analysis anticipated by the same scholars
who suggested the test.163 Additionally, the Court seemingly underplayed
the extraterritorial nature of the facts, relying solely on statutory
construction while underemphasizing the overall context in which the
statute was written.164 In response to WesternGeco, commentators
criticized the holding’s overly simplistic view of these controversial
extraterritoriality issues.165 Joining in the commentators’ criticism, Justice
Gorsuch departed from the majority’s holding and wrote a dissent voicing
his dissatisfaction.
A. Justice Gorsuch’s WesternGeco Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Breyer, expressed
worry with the majority’s holding.166 Recognizing the comity concerns,
Justice Gorsuch felt the majority’s view too expansively included all § 284
damages as a result of a § 271(f) infringement and reiterated that “[a] U.S.
patent provides a lawful monopoly over the manufacture, use and sale of an

161. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2019); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993); Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749 (suggesting courts need to
provide more extensive reasoning).
162. See generally WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
163. Id.; Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40.
164. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129. The phrase “overall context” refers to the
general idea that our law goes only to our borders; any extension of laws beyond
our borders requires congressional permission and, even then, requires a careful
analysis to ensure that the situation at bar is the type of situation to which
Congress intended to extend our laws. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (“Although its opinion focuses almost entirely on why the
presumption against extraterritoriality applicable to all statutes does not forbid the
damages sought here, the Court asserts in a few cursory sentences that the Patent
Act by its terms allows recovery for foreign uses in cases like this.”).
165. 260 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELOR NL 2, Westlaw (Aug. 2018
Update). The holding in WesternGeco, although widely anticipated, “circumvent[ed]
some controversial extraterritoriality issues . . . . [W]hile the decision probably will
have a big impact, the justices were careful to limit the holding by circumventing some
controversial extraterritorial issues.” Id.
166. See generally WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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invention within this country only.”167 Justice Gorsuch further characterized
WesternGeco’s recovery as a false monopoly.168 WesternGeco invoked
domestic patent protection to effectively enforce a monopoly abroad for
WesternGeco’s surveying business.169 According to Justice Gorsuch, this
case impermissibly extended the monopoly of a U.S. patent holder to
include foreign markets.170
Impermissible patent-protection overreach poses the risk of retaliation
by foreign sovereigns.171 By forcefully applying United States law to
foreign conduct and awarding a patent holder foreign profits, the Court
risks “invit[ing] other countries to use their own patent laws and courts to
assert control over our economy.”172 In the wake of WesternGeco, scholars
echoed this concern by concentrating on the holding’s potential
encouragement of foreign countermeasures and exacerbation of existing
international trade tensions.173 Furthermore, Justice Gorsuch pointed out
167. Id. at 2143 (emphasis added). This reasoning also comports with the
extraterritorial approach to copyright law. See Los Angeles News Service v.
Reuters Television Int’l. Ltd., 340 F.3d 926, 927, 931–932 (2003) (“[N]o liability
could arise under the Copyright Act for acts of infringement that occurred outside
of the United States, . . . unless it falls underneath a narrow exception for the
recovery of the infringer’s profits.”). But see Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g
Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d. Cir. 1988) (awarding damages based on foreign
infringement because the “predicate act of direct infringement occurred”).
168. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 2142 (“Under WesternGeco’s approach, however, the patent owner
could recover any profits it lost to that foreign competition . . . effectively giving
the patent owner a monopoly over foreign markets through its U.S. patent.”).
170. Id. (“Because an infringement must occur within the United States, that
means a plaintiff can recover damages for the making, using, or selling of its
invention within the United States, but not for the making, using, or selling of its
invention elsewhere.”). This overreach impermissibly permits “U.S. patent owners
to use American courts to extend their monopolies to foreign markets.” Id.
171. Id. (“That, in turn, would invite other countries to use their own patent
laws and courts to assert control over our economy. Nothing in the terms of the
Patent Act supports that result and much militates against it.”).
172. Id.
173. 260 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELOR NL 2, Westlaw (Aug. 2018
Update). (“Dr. Dariush Adli, an attorney and founder of Adli Law Group in Los
Angeles, who also was not involved in the case, agreed the decision likely will
prompt complaints and countermeasures from other countries.”) (“Michele Van
Patten Frank, an attorney at Venable’s Washington office, said other countries
could see the decision as an opportunity for U.S. patent holders to expand into
foreign markets, and they could retaliate. ‘It is not often that a Supreme Court
patent law decision has the potential to exacerbate international trade dispute
tensions,’ she said.”).
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the majority’s anomalous implications: “It would allow greater recovery
when a defendant exports a component of an invention in violation of
§ 271(f)(2) than when a defendant exports the entire invention in violation
of § 271(f).”174 Section 271(a) protects against use of the infringing device
within the United States; § 271(f) does not contain the same territorial
limitation.175 The Court’s allowance of foreign lost profits in WesternGeco,
therefore, permits a patent holder to recover foreign lost profits in the
instance where foreign use of the infringing device contains just a
component from the United States per § 271(a).176 Conversely, if the same
manufacturer wholly produced the same infringing device within the United
States, the use of that infringing device abroad would not result in recovery
of the foreign lost profits because the cause of action derives from § 271(a),
which only protects against use within the United States.177 This anomaly
deserves pointed attention to reconcile these results.
Directly addressing the possible retaliation by offended countries,
Justice Gorsuch posited: “If our courts award compensation to U.S. patent
owners for foreign uses where our patents don’t run, what happens when
foreign courts return the favor?”178 In sum, Justice Gorsuch cautioned
against the majority’s awarding of foreign damages under § 284 in
redressing infringement under § 271(f).179 Justice Gorsuch essentially
argued that foreign damages should not be available in the patent law
context, lest the Court “end[] up assuming that patent damages run
(literally) to the ends of the earth.”180 This argument, however, likely cuts
too far in the opposite direction.181 Certainly, Justice Gorsuch accurately
noted the majority’s lack of analytic rigor,182 but to say that the majority
reached the wrong conclusion overlooks a key element of patent
protection: shielding the patent holder from clear acts of infringement.183
Despite knowledge of the extraterritorial concerns and access to
respected scholars’ extraterritorial analyses,184 the Court nevertheless

174. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2142.
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2018); id. § 271(a).
176. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f); id. § 271(a).
177. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
178. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 2139 (majority opinion).
184. See id.; Brief of Houston IP Law Assoc., supra note 135; Brief of IP Law
Scholars, supra note 40.
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narrowly construed extraterritoriality.185 Moreover, if the Court intended to
make a narrow decision to avoid a wide-reaching precedent, a full-blown
factual analysis would have better accomplished that goal, instead of the
superficial analysis in the opinion.186 By focusing on enumerated factors,
rather than statutory construction, the court could have altered the 271(f)
analysis to give future courts flexibility in determining the most equitable
result on a case-by-case basis.187 This fact-sensitive approach would have
avoided the current rigidity of WesternGeco, thereby allowing lower courts
to stray from the holding in certain situations.188
B. WesternGeco’s Impact
The effects of the WesternGeco approach to extraterritorial damages
have already begun to materialize.189 Mere weeks after the Supreme Court
decided WesternGeco, Power Integrations, Inc.190—to whom the appellate
court denied extraterritorial damages on a § 271(a) claim partly based on the
Federal Circuit’s holding in WesternGeco191—argued that the Supreme
Court’s reversal regarding extraterritorial damages in WesternGeco
necessitated their own extraterritorial damages award.192 The appellate court
agreed.193 In a memorandum order, the court explained that, even though the
alleged infringing conduct differed from that in WesternGeco,194 the parties
made no convincing argument for treating the infringement differently.195
185. WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129; Holbrook, supra note 16.
186. A fact-intensive analysis allows courts to decide a case in a given way
but leaves room for subsequent courts to reach a different outcome on a slightly
different set of facts, as equity necessitates.
187. 260 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELOR NL 2, Westlaw (Aug. 2018
Update).
188. See supra note 186.
189. See generally Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp.,
No. CV 04-1371-LPS, 2018 WL 4804685 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2018).
190. See discussion supra Part II.
191. See WesternGeco, 837 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
192. See generally Power Integrations, 2018 WL 4804685.
193. See generally id.
194. In WesternGeco, the underlying infringement arose from § 271(f). See
WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018). In Power
Integrations, the underlying infringement arose from § 271(a). See Power
Integrations, 2018 WL 4804685.
195. Power Integrations, 2018 WL 4804685, at *1 (“[N]o persuasive reason
to conclude that the interpretation of § 284 should differ here from what was
available in WesternGeco II just because the type of infringing conduct alleged is
different.”).
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Thus, despite the underlying infringement originating from § 271(a)—a
provision wholly disconnected from the loophole closed in Deepsouth’s
wake—the Power Integrations court understood the WesternGeco holding
to implicitly overrule its own, thereby mandating the court to expand the
scope of the available damages on remand.196
The Power Integrations memorandum order is case-in-point why the
Supreme Court’s oversimplification of extraterritorial damages could lead
to U.S. patent law overreach.197 The Court’s failure to limit the holding to
WesternGeco’s facts has already led to further overreach as patent holders
begin to enjoy the pecuniary surplusage associated with the availability of
extraterritorial damages.198 As courts continue to address these
extraterritorial patent cases, WesternGeco impedes their ability to steer
away from foreign damages in more egregious cases that heighten the
retaliatory risk. Lastly, even on more justifiable facts, U.S. courts’
awarding of offensive extraterritorial damages, thereby extending the
reach of U.S. patent law, risks everything from condemnation of the
international community at a minimum to systematic retaliatory overreach
by offended nations.199
In sum, the Court in WesternGeco, despite knowledge of these
extraterritorial concerns and access to well-thought analyses, merely glossed
over extraterritoriality, dismissing the proposed analyses.200 Furthermore,
the Court looked favorably upon the idea that a rigorous infringement
analysis regarding § 271(f) should serve to safeguard against
extraterritoriality, and, once a court determines liability, § 284 should award
all damages therefor.201 This view is in opposition to the ideas that: (1) the
196. “It logically follows that when the Supreme Court expressly overruled
WesternGeco I it also implicitly overruled Power Integrations.” Id. at *1–2.
“WesternGeco II is a ‘contrary and applicable’ decision, so the Court must comply
with the Supreme Court’s holding in WesternGeco II.” Id (internal citations
omitted).
197. See generally id.
198. Id.
199. For an example of U.S. law overreach that resulted in retaliatory actions,
see Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial Applications of U.S. Antitrust Laws to
Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving
International Conflicts Within the Pacific Community, 16 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 295, 296 (1983) (“One of the most serious [results of an
extraterritorial application of U.S. law] was marked by retaliatory legislation
initiated by several foreign countries.”).
200. See WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018);
Brief of Houston IP Law Assoc., supra note 135; Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra
note 40.
201. See generally WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
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§ 284 extraterritorial inquiry regarding foreign damages should involve
in-depth analysis independent from the § 271(f) analysis, and (2) U.S. patent
law only applies domestically.202 The majority misapplied § 284 by
suggesting that all damages flow upon infringement of any kind.203 On the
other hand, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent conflated §§ 271(a) and 271(f) by
suggesting that only domestic damages flow upon infringement of any
kind.204 Both of these views, however, miss the mark. This binary
application of § 284—where either all damages flow or no damages flow,
depending on whether the court finds infringement under § 271(f)—allows
courts to abrogate their full responsibility, including consideration of
repercussions of their holdings.205 Lacking analytic rigor, the Court in
WesternGeco hid behind the RJR Nabisco test that it claimed “clearly
reaches the extraterritorial conduct at issue in this case,” likely to enact the
result it felt most equitably redressed the situation.206 This approach lacks
proper nuance.207 Under a conflicts or factor test, WesternGeco still could
202. Brief of Houston IP Law Assoc., supra note 135 (“Admittedly, patent law
is far more territorial than other areas of intellectual property.”).
203. See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
204. See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Brief for
Respondent, WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129.
205. As presently articulated, the RJR Nabisco test appears to operate like a
switch—the statute either has extraterritorial reach or it does not. See Holbrook,
supra note 16, at 1785 (“All of the above analysis treats the issue of the territorial
limits on patent damages as binary: either damages will be permitted or not.”; see
also Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l Unlimited, 149 F.3d
987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998):
Nor would a copyright holder be entitled to recover
extraterritorial damages unless the damages flowed from
extraterritorial exploitation of an infringing act that occurred in
the United States. In Subafilms, the court reasoned that liability
based solely on the authorization of infringing acts “would
produce the untenable anomaly, inconsistent with the general
principles of third party liability, that a party could be held
liable as an infringer for violating the ‘authorization’ right when
the party that it authorized could not be considered an infringer
under the Copyright Act.”
Id. (citing Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1094
(9th Cir. 1994)) (suggesting the binary application of infringement and damages
in the copyright context); see also Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988).
206. Brief of Houston IP Law Assoc., supra note 135, at *3; see also 260
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELOR NL 2, Westlaw (Aug. 2018 Update).
207. See generally Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749 (arguing for a more
nuanced approach).

337366-LSU_80-1_Text.indd 196

11/27/19 9:28 AM

2019]

COMMENT

191

have prevailed, and the Court would have set a favorable precedent that
would have urged fact-sensitive analyses in future cases.208
IV. PROPOSED CONFLICT OF LAWS APPROACH AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW FACTOR TEST
An ideal solution to this issue must address several countervailing
notions and policy considerations. First, the solution must consider a
patent holder’s rights and interests by forcefully protecting § 271(f),
thereby keeping the Deepsouth loophole tightly shut as Congress
intended.209 Second, the solution must remain flexible, such that courts
consistently support the most equitable remedy on a case-by-case basis,
while simultaneously maintaining a semblance of predictability to mitigate
litigation costs and allow businesses to properly analyze risk and
adequately value patents.210 A conflict of laws test or, alternatively, a
factor test would best reconcile these principles.
A. Conflict of Laws Analysis
If neither Congress nor the executive branch elucidates a solution,
courts have a duty to decide the case at bar. Since Congressional action
remains sluggish, courts must take immediate action to preserve the status
quo. To that end, a conflict of laws test, although sacrificing certainty,
forces courts to fully explain the reasoning behind their holdings,
providing an actionable solution to the WesternGeco problem.
Several scholars have posed conflict of laws tests in the extraterritorial
patent damages context that address the issue in slightly different ways.211
The conflict of laws approach rests on the notion that if Congress intended
extraterritorial applications of a given statute, it would have addressed the

208. See generally WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
209. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2018); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406
U.S. 518 (1972).
210. Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM &
MARY L. REV. 2119, 2168 (2008) (“The uncertainty . . . would be detrimental to
the business community, which dislikes risk and prefers certainty in planning.”).
211. See id. at 2168.
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conflict of laws issue.212 Moreover, if U.S. patent law abrogates the laws
of foreign nations, it cannot apply. 213
One of these conflict-based approaches only permits the
extraterritorial enforcement of a patent when the alleged infringing acts
would be considered infringement in the foreign country.214 On the one
hand, this conflict analysis mitigates egregiousness in enforcing a
domestic patent abroad by ensuring that the offended nation’s laws also
would have upheld the finding of infringement.215 This approach,
however, contains many drawbacks.216 Namely, it would be difficult for
courts to both assess possible domestic infringement and then to apply
foreign law to determine whether the activity in question infringes the
patent.217 This method would greatly increase litigation costs because the
already-lengthy patent litigation process would become even more
arduous as experts, lawyers, and judges must navigate an unfamiliar patent
system.218 Additionally, this approach would significantly reduce
predictability of foreign damages, negatively affecting the ability to assess
business risks.219 Unpredictability in business not only makes it difficult
to properly value patent assets but also inserts more uncertainty in
manufacturing decisions.220 Presumably, concerns with this conflict-based
approach deterred the Court from adopting this method.221 Accordingly,
an appropriate conflict-based test must provide courts with a more
digestible analytical burden, which would help aid predictability and
reduce litigation costs for companies to better operate in the global
market.222
212. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
256 (1991) (“[It is] reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended [the
provision] to apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with
foreign laws and procedures.”).
213. See Holbrook, supra note 210, at 2120.
214. See id. at 2166.
215. See id. at 2168.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana's Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability, 60 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1069
(2000) (“[M]odern common law approaches to conflicts problems are vulnerable
to criticism on the grounds that they provide insufficient decisional predictability
and all of the attendant costs that come with a lack of predictability.”); see also
supra Part II.
221. See Holbrook, supra note 210, at 2168.
222. See id.
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1. Louisiana’s Conflict of Laws Approach
The unique nature of Louisiana’s conflict of laws approach makes it
ripe for courts’ use in analyzing a transnational patent issue.223 Louisiana’s
basic conflict of laws approach essentially focuses on which sovereign has
a greater interest in controlling the alleged conduct.224 Article 3515 of the
Louisiana Civil Code further adopts an inherent holistic economic
approach in which courts consider policies in light of the relationship
between the states and the overall needs of the interstate system.225 In
doing so, Louisiana Civil Code article 3515 strikes a balance between
“legal certainty and flexibility: more certainty than any other state of the
United States and more flexibility than any European conflicts system.”226
Accordingly, article 3515 provides an ideal solution to foreign damages in
patent law;227 its certainty allows businesses to confidently value their
assets and make informed manufacturing decisions, while its flexibility
aids courts in determining the most equitable remedy on a case-by-case
basis.228

223. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2018):
Except as otherwise provided in this Book, an issue in a case having
contacts with other states is governed by the law of the state whose
policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to
that issue. That state is determined by evaluating the strength and
pertinence of the relevant policies of all involved states in the light of:
(1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2)
the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems,
including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties
and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow from
subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.
224. Id.; Robert A. Sedler, The Louisiana Codification and Tort Rules of
Choice of Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1330 (2000).
225. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515; Sedler supra note 224, at n.28.
226. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Conflicts Book of the Louisiana Civil Code:
Civilian, American, or Original?, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1058 (2009).
227. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515.
228. These are the types of policy balancing necessary in the foreign lost
profits context; Louisiana’s conflict of laws approach “attempts to attain an
appropriate balance between specificity and generality and between certainty and
flexibility.” Symeonides, supra note 226, at 1065.
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2. Application of Article 3515 in WesternGeco
As applied to WesternGeco, article 3515 would support the award of
foreign profits.229 Under article 3515, the law of the sovereign with the
greatest policy interest in governing the issue controls.230 Considering the
location of the extraterritorial activity—on the high seas231—the United
States’ interest in protecting the U.S. patent holder outweighs any other
country’s interest in applying its own patent laws.232 Accordingly, in this
case, the United States’ law should apply to its fullest effect—under the
article 3515 approach, courts should treat the conduct as if it occurred
within the United States. Removing the territoriality issue, this
domestic-like application of § 284 allows WesternGeco to fully recover.
Counterfactually, the result would change if, for example, the
infringing act under § 271(f) had occurred in China. Considering the trade
tensions between the United States and China,233 China’s interest in
restricting U.S. patent law likely outweighs the United States’ interest in
229. See WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
Note, the proposed application differs slightly from Louisiana’s application
because in article 3515, the general conflicts provision only applies in the absence
of a more specific conflicts rule.
230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515.
231. WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, at 1352 (“[T]he
dissent expresses concern that our ruling today might effectively prevent
WesternGeco from recovering lost profits at all, as the surveys were conducted
on the high seas and were outside of the territorial reach of any patent jurisdiction
in the world. This may or may not be the case.”). The current understanding
regarding traditional patent infringement under § 271(a) suggests that the location
of the infringement is not where the activity occurs, but where the contracts are
entered into. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the location of the
extraterritorial activity in WesternGeco may not be the high seas, but perhaps
where the future sale will occur, where the contract was entered, or alternatively,
where the profits were made. This Comment does not address this distinction but,
rather, takes the simpler approach that the pertinent location is where the
infringing acts occur, not where the parties transact.
232. See generally WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1360 (“Outside the territorial sea
are the high seas, which are international waters not subject to the dominion of
any single nation.”) (citing United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 (1969)).
233. Jim Zarroli, Trump Says Tariffs Are Needed to Protect Vital Industries, But
Are They?, NPR (March 12, 2018, 5:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/2018/03/12
/592886128/trump-says-tariffs-are-needed-to-protect-vital-industries-but-are-they
[https://perma.cc/G8ET-WDPY].
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full remuneration to the patent holder.234 This situation would likely result
in recovery of reasonable royalties—the minimum amount recoverable
under § 284—and militates against the recovery of excess foreign
damages, including foreign lost profits.235 As illustrated, article 3515
provides a flexible approach that courts can adapt to fit the situation.
B. Factor Test
A conflict of laws approach is not the only available route: a foreign
relations law factor test—as applied by Justice Scalia in a landmark
antitrust case236—provides courts with an alternative actionable solution
that similarly supplies courts with a framework in which to more fully
explain their holdings.
1. The Late Justice Scalia’s Take
Remaining primarily governed by domestic law, U.S. antitrust law
frequently addresses the intersection of monopolistic commerce and
territoriality on an international scale. In Hartford Fire Insurance v.
California, a 1993 antitrust case, the Court addressed an insurance dispute
involving several domestic insurers and London-based reinsurers.237
Grounded in the Sherman Antitrust Act,238 the Court’s approach addressed
the clash between foreign and domestic laws, ultimately holding a foreign
company liable in the United States for foreign conduct.239 Similar to
§ 271, the Sherman Act “applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States.”240 Thus, although antitrust law relies on an effects test to
determine domestic liability, patent law’s approach is more geographic
insofar as a company is liable if a portion of the manufacturing occurs
234. This logic is in light of the recent intellectual property tension between
the United States and China, by which China faces allegations of facilitating
intellectual property theft from the United States. Accordingly, China has a strong
interest in keeping United States laws away from its intellectual property.
235. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
236. See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 764 (1993).
237. Id.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1–7 (2018). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was enacted in 1890
to limit business transactions that result in anti-competitive, monopolistic
practices. See id.
239. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 765 (citing Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale v. United States D. S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)).
240. Id. at 796.
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within the United States.241 Nevertheless, both fields frequently implicate
extraterritorial considerations.242
In the antitrust context, the Court in Hartford Fire held that the
Sherman Act’s application did not conflict with principles of international
comity because it was possible to comply with the laws of both
countries.243 Justice Scalia, dissenting, more thoroughly evaluated the
comity implications,244 promoting lasting considerations in the antitrust
context with his extraterritoriality reasoning.245 Justice Scalia referred to
this extraterritoriality aspect—whether the Court should be meddling in
these foreign affairs—as “legislative jurisdiction.”246 The analysis Justice
Scalia employed began with the two canons of statutory construction.247
The first canon considers the presumption against extraterritoriality.248
The Sherman Act frequently addresses extraterritorial conduct, therefore
frequently overcoming the presumption, but Justice Scalia’s inquiry did
not stop there.249 Similarly, patent laws should not cease the inquiry at this
preliminary step.250 Even if the facts warrant overcoming the presumption,
courts should continue analyzing factors to ensure fair play with foreign
nations.251

241. Id. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
242. Brief of IP Law Scholars, supra note 40.
243. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799.
244. Id. at 812.
245. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
“[A]ntitrust prosecution could not be based on wholly extraterritorial conduct.”
Id. at 2.
246. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 253 (1991)). “Legislative jurisdiction” specifically refers to
“the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities,” as
distinguished from the more familiar “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” Id.
247. Id. at 814.
248. Id.
249. Id. (“[I]t is now well established that the Sherman Act applies
extraterritorially.”) Id. (citations omitted).
250. Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749. Moreover, patent law is not as quick to
overcome the presumption as antitrust law.
251. For an illustration of a court’s in-depth application of the Hartford Fire
factors in an intellectual property case, see Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d
960, 972–76 (9th Cir. 2016). Therein, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
extraterritorial nature of a trademark dispute arising from a Canadian citizen’s
acts that occurred mostly in Canada and partly in the United States. In determining
that the defendant’s activities established a sufficient nexus to apply U.S. laws,
the court diligently analyzed each Hartford Fire factor.
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Justice Scalia then addressed the second canon of statutory
construction in Hartford Fire: “[A]n act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”252 This “wholly independent” canon further filters whether U.S.
courts are improperly impeding foreign sovereigns’ substantive laws by
continuing the extraterritoriality inquiry beyond the presumption.253
After extensive discussion regarding the two canons of statutory
construction, Justice Scalia then turned to the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law’s reasonableness test to continue his analysis of the
comity implications.254 The Restatement’s reasonableness test relies on an
eight-factor analysis to determine the reasonableness of the extraterritorial
application of a domestic law, which includes, for example, “the link of
the activity to the territory of the regulating state.”255 In analyzing these
factors, Justice Scalia determined that U.S. courts could not exercise
legislative jurisdiction and enact consequences on the defendant absent a
clear signal from Congress.256 Despite coming from an antitrust case, these
252. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 818; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
255. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2):
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system.
256. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
determined that it would be “unimaginable that an assertion of legislative
jurisdiction by the United States would be considered reasonable, and therefore it
is inappropriate to assume, in the absence of statutory indication to the contrary,
that Congress has made such an assertion.” Id.
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factors have wider applicability, as evidenced by their use in subject matter
outside of antitrust law—including intellectual property.257
2. Reconciling Antitrust and Patent Law
Justice Scalia’s dissent illustrates the pitfalls of relying solely on the
presumption against extraterritoriality.258 Despite concluding that the facts
in Hartford Fire overcame the presumption, Justice Scalia, after
rigorously applying the second canon of statutory construction259 and the
Restatement’s reasonableness test, concluded that the statute in question
was unreasonable and therefore should not apply.260
Courts ought to apply a similar meticulousness in the patent law
context.261 In the patent damages context, the following adapted foreign
relations law factors should encourage meaningful discussion by U.S.
courts: (1) the extent to which financial harm occurred in a given
jurisdiction—specifically, where the harmful acts occurred and where the
involved parties contracted;262 (2) whether the infringing party has a
substantial connection to the United States; (3) the degree to which the
given situation impacts United States’ policy interests;263 (4) the
reasonable expectations of the injured party; and (5) the overall impact the
holding will have on an international scale.264 Although it is impossible to
account for all possible repercussions of an extraterritoriality holding, an
extensive analysis resembling Justice Scalia’s approach in Hartford Fire
would mitigate the risk of eliciting an adverse response from another
country due to a court’s lost foreign profits judgment in a § 271(f) case.265
257. See Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 972–76 (9th Cir. 2016).
258. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 814–815 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 6 U.S.
(Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)) (“[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”).
260. Id. at 819.
261. See Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
262. This factor encourages the court to consider the current understanding
regarding traditional patent infringement under § 271(a), which suggests that the
location of the infringement is not where the activity occurs, but where the
contracts are entered into. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d
1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
263. This factor is specifically based on Louisiana Civil Code article 3515(1)
and factor (c) of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2).
264. This factor is specifically based on Louisiana Civil Code article 3515(2)
and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2) factors (e)–(f).
265. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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A more careful consideration would reduce the potential of jeopardizing
the United States’ international standing and prevent possible trade
distortions as a result.266 For these reasons, courts in the future should
utilize either the exact factors espoused in Hartford Fire267 or some
variation of these factors better fitted for a patent law application.
CONCLUSION
In future § 271(f) cases, considering the low probability of
Congressional action in this arena, courts should heed scholars’ warnings
and fully consider the policy considerations of extraterritorial damages
with full protection of the U.S. patent on one hand, while restricting U.S.
overreach on the other. A conflict-based analysis significantly reduces the
risk that U.S. courts might jeopardize the United States’ international
standing concerning intellectual property.268 In limiting recovery of these
foreign damages, U.S. courts will dampen the clout of opportunistic
companies looking to exploit U.S. law, like Deepsouth, by tightly closing
the loophole exposed in 1972.269 Lastly, the conflict-based approach
provides the courts with proper direction by forcing them to contemplate
pertinent extraterritorial considerations in their analyses.270
Likewise, the proposed Louisiana conflict of laws solution provides a
similar, albeit less clear, balancing test where courts specifically
contemplate a risk-benefit analysis in each case by determining which
country has the greatest interest in the extraterritorial situation.271 Finally,
the Hartford Fire factors force courts to exhaustively consider the facts of
each case to adequately address all viewpoints.272
Although WesternGeco initially appears to be an obscure case in a niche
area of the law, the extraterritorial implications of the § 271(f) carve-out
have potential far-reaching consequences. This Comment proposes two
different approaches. First, courts should apply Louisiana Civil Code article
266. See Amy Landers, U.S. Patent Extraterritoriality Within the International
Context, 36 REV. LITIG. BRIEF 28, 34 (2016).
267. For an extensive illustration in which the Ninth Circuit fully analyzed the
Hartford Fire factors, see Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 972–76 (9th
Cir. 2016).
268. See supra Part IV.
269. See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
270. The courts’ inconsistent application of the presumption effectively destroys
the presumption’s efficacy. See generally Holbrook, supra note 16, at 1749.
271. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2018).
272. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 800 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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3515 in § 271(f) cases to determine the extent of damages in light of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Alternatively, courts should adopt
factors, such as those used in Hartford Fire, to determine whether the
defendant’s activities present a sufficient nexus to the United States to
justify awarding foreign lost profits. Both of these solutions force courts to
fully espouse their reasoning and allow for a greater degree of factual
sensitivity. Consequently, this analysis affords courts more case-to-case
flexibility. Flexibility avoids the notion of a sweeping precedent to which
courts must adhere. Additionally, flexibility allows courts to shape their
holdings with the consequences of the results in mind, allowing courts to
strike the appropriate balance between full remuneration to the patent-holder
and containing the reach of U.S. patent law.
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